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INTRODUCTION
Traditional public housing in the United States is currently undergoing conversion to a program called the Rental Assistance Demonstration
(“RAD”).1 Created by Julián Castro’s Housing and Urban Development
(“HUD”) administration during President Obama’s tenure,2 RAD has already been adopted by Public Housing Authorities (“PHA”) from San
Francisco to Baltimore.3 In 2017, RAD came to New York City, where
Mayor Bill de Blasio and the New York City Housing Authority, colloquially known as NYCHA, have aggressively embraced the program.4
NYCHA is by far the largest PHA in the country, housing more individuals than many mid-size American cities.5 Through the rise and fall of
New York City’s fortunes, NYCHA has been one of the stalwarts of affordable housing in the city since the first NYCHA buildings were constructed in the 1930s.6 In New York, which has some of the most catastrophically high rents in the country—if not the world—and where
hyper-gentrification has decimated long-standing working-class communities of color,7 NYCHA is the last large-scale bastion of deeply affordable housing throughout the five boroughs. More than that, public housing,
beginning with NYCHA, was one of the great public works projects of
the 20th century, and supporters of the first public housing developments
advocated for housing as a “‘public enterprise’ in the same category as
transportation and education.”8
While NYCHA has endured, it is not without serious problems. Beginning in the 1970s, public housing was maligned as part of the welfare
state and fell out of favor as the public embraced a burgeoning neoliberal
economic ideology.9 As public housing became more unpopular in the

1 Shamus Roller & Jessica Cassella, The Promise and Peril of HUD’s RAD Program,
SHELTERFORCE (July 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/4USE-Z6HA.
2 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. 112-55, § 4,
125 Stat. 552, 673.
3 Roller & Casella, supra note 1.
4 Amir Khafagy, NYCHA’s Embrace of RAD Program Brings a Mix of Praise and
Worry, SHELTERFORCE (Oct. 9, 2018), https://perma.cc/NMT4-Y3MR.
5 N.Y.C. HOUS. AUTH., NYCHA 2019 FACT SHEET 1 (2019), https://perma.cc/BW53J8HP.
6 Id.
7 SAMUEL STEIN, CAPITAL CITY: GENTRIFICATION AND THE REAL ESTATE STATE 3-4
(2019); see also JEREMIAH MOSS, VANISHING NEW YORK: HOW A GREAT CITY LOST ITS SOUL
passim (2017).
8 Public Housing Asked by Workers, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1934, at L18,
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1934/06/29/93762064.pdf.
9 David Erickson, The Housing Policy Revolution, COMMUNITY INV., Winter 2009/2010,
at 24, 25-27, https://perma.cc/B2VE-BHCC; see Ganesh Sitaraman, The Collapse of Neoliberalism, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 23, 2019), https://perma.cc/GT3Z-UFWN.
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public consciousness, the federal government responded with a series of
budget cuts over the ensuing decades.10 Budget shortfalls coupled with an
aging housing stock have led to serious deficiencies in the infrastructure
of the buildings, and some estimates to repair NYCHA properties total as
much as $32 billion.11
In an effort to close the funding deficit hampering the nation’s
PHAs,12 HUD created the RAD program, which proposes new regulatory
agreements to convert PHAs to project-based Section 8 vouchers.13 After
the agreements are made, private landlords offer bids to act as a management company by maintaining the property and overseeing day-to-day
operations while collecting rent. 14 So far, public housing advocates in
New York have generally supported the RAD program because it has
been proffered as the only feasible option to get the funding NYCHA
needs to make necessary repairs.15 Advocates and city government officials believe that it is more advisable to accept private capital in the short
term than to hold out for federal funding that likely will never arrive.16
One of the things that most concerns tenants and some advocates is
whether RAD amounts to a privatization of NYCHA. NYCHA itself, in
conjunction with the city and HUD, has repeatedly emphasized that RAD
is not a program of privatization: a brochure about RAD published by
NYCHA states that “this is a public-private partnership . . . . NYCHA
will enter into long-term lease agreements with development partners that
will repair and manage the properties.”17 The same brochure attempts to
dispel fears of total loss of public control by declaring that “NYCHA will
10 VICTOR BACH, CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y, PUBLIC HOUSING: NEW YORK’S THIRD CITY 3
(2017), https://perma.cc/3DFY-JP7S.
11 Katie Honan, Repair Costs for NYCHA Properties Skyrocket to $31.8 Billion, WALL
ST. J. (July 2, 2018, 8:40 PM), https://perma.cc/39A4-RNEB.
12 See Pam Fessler, Trump Administration Wants to Cut Funding for Public Housing Repairs, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 16, 2019, 11:39 AM), https://perma.cc/5Y9B-8PLK.
13 Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD), U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., https://
perma.cc/PHJ8-CXPS (last visited May 7, 2020) (“RAD was created in order to give public
housing authorities (PHAs) a powerful tool to preserve and improve public housing properties
and address the $26 billion dollar nationwide backlog of deferred maintenance.”); see Emma
Whitford, NYCHA Residents and Advocates Fear City’s Revised Privatization Plan Will Put
Tenant Rights at Risk, GOTHAMIST (Apr. 23, 2019, 11:39 AM), https://perma.cc/555Z-9Y8E.
14 NAT’L HOUS. LAW PROJECT, AN ADVOCATE’S GUIDE TO PUBLIC HOUSING CONVERSIONS
UNDER COMPONENT 1 OF THE RENTAL ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION 6-7 (2016),
https://perma.cc/6PQJ-5S94; Roller & Casella, supra note 1.
15 See Alicia Glen, Why We Can’t Fix Affordable Housing: It Isn’t from Lack of Trying,
CITYLAB (Oct. 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/B8ME-PYWC.
16 Id.; see also Nicholas Dagen Bloom, Make NYCHA Great Again: A Progressive
Mayor’s Obligation, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 14, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://perma.cc/F6LJFUQS.
17 N.Y.C. HOUS. AUTH., CREATING A PERMANENT AFFORDABILITY COMMITMENT TOGETHER: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2019), https://perma.cc/KTT3-QB76.
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continue to own the land and buildings.”18 In this sense, RAD does not
meet a strict definition of privatization, where ownership is transferred
from municipal control to the private sector.19 However, many residents
are skeptical of NYCHA’s claims, and there are sufficient indications that
RAD is merely the initial step towards dismantling public housing entirely.20
How did NYCHA, one of the great public works programs of the 20th
century, find itself in this position? In this Note, I argue that NYCHA and
PHAs across the country have been subject to a quasi “shock doctrine,” a
term coined by Naomi Klein to describe a form of neoliberalism that exploits a disaster in order to privatize public goods.21 The fiscal disaster
facing PHAs that allowed for the private market to step in has developed
over decades of budget cuts beginning with the austerity and deregulation
of the 1970s neoliberal agenda.22 Simultaneous with the rise of neoliberal
economics was the integration of public housing. As public housing became racially diverse after enforcement of the Civil Rights Act, largely
white public housing residents were forced to integrate with communities
of color, and politicians began to criticize and defund public housing.23
By the 1990s, the reality of the public housing projects in New York City
matched the discriminatory rhetoric peddled by politicians.24 People took
for granted that public housing could not sustain itself and that it would
require outside assistance to be rescued. This in turn set the stage for legislation that would allow private players to get involved in the management of NYCHA buildings and ultimately profit through a complex system of tax abatements and city contracts.
The goal of this paper is twofold: first, to show that PHAs, and more
specifically NYCHA, did not reach this point through mismanagement,25
18

Id.
For a strict definition of privatization, see Mary M. Shirley, The What, Why, and How
of Privatization: A World Bank Perspective, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S23, S24 (1992).
20 For a discussion of the uncertainties of permanent affordability under RAD, see infra
Section III.C.
21 NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM 7 (2010).
22 See infra Sections I.B and C for a discussion of the rise of the ideology of austerity and
subsequent budget cuts to public housing.
23 LAWRENCE J. VALE, PURGING THE POOREST: PUBLIC HOUSING AND THE DESIGN POLITICS
OF TWICE-CLEARED COMMUNITIES 16-18 (2013); Luis Ferré-Sadurní, The Rise and Fall of New
York Public Housing, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2018), https://perma.cc/E5UB-ADKU.
24 Jarrett Murphy, Chapter 2: The Life and Times of Public Housing, CITY LIMITS (Jan.
10, 2009), https://perma.cc/Y7V5-JCZT; Richard Rothstein, Race and Public Housing: Revisiting the Federal Role, POVERTY & RACE, Nov./Dec. 2012, at 1, 2, 15-16, https://perma.cc/
EGX4-CAT8.
25 While mismanagement was certainly an issue in some PHAs, it is not the focus of this
paper and, I believe, not nearly as important a factor as severe funding cuts over a prolonged
period.
19
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nor through the failures of the public housing residents themselves. After
decades of funding the construction of hundreds of thousands of units
across the country,26 public housing was subject to an intentional defunding scheme beginning in the 1970s, a time of both racial integration and
a burgeoning economic ideology of neoliberalism that led to massive
budget cuts, leaving PHAs without the funding they needed to survive.27
The first section discusses the history of public housing—demonstrating
how NYCHA has always been carefully controlled by the philanthropic
goals of the wealthy and backed by federal funding—and how it was subsequently abandoned once it became more racially diverse and public
housing as a philanthropic goal fell out of favor.
The second goal of the paper is to show that the current RAD scheme
is a bold step toward privatizing public housing. Unlike the wealthy New
York elites who were interested in housing the poor at the turn of the 20th
century, current wealthy elites are mainly capital investors who realize
that NYCHA buildings are on extremely valuable land, owing to the resurgence of New York in the 1980s and 1990s.28 This realization has created a new partnership between HUD and private investors in the form of
RAD. Although the regulatory agreements to convert public housing
through RAD contain protections for residents to maintain their current
levels of affordability, there are good reasons to believe that this is the
beginning of a chain of events that will lead to transfer of ownership to
the private market, as that will yield the largest profits for the private investors. Indeed, as we have seen in other privatization schemes, including
charter schools, private prisons, and medical services, private actors do
not always provide a superior service but rather are looking for exploitable loopholes to maximize their profits.29 Because of public housing’s
history as a tool for elite interests, coupled with some suspicious loopholes in the RAD regulatory agreements, I argue that RAD is a calculated,

26

The Housing Act of 1949 authorized the construction of 810,000 units nationwide. U.S.
DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., MAJOR LEGISLATION ON HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
ENACTED SINCE 1932 (2014), https://perma.cc/8SM3-RFQE; see NICHOLAS DAGEN BLOOM,
PUBLIC HOUSING THAT WORKED: NEW YORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 117 (2008).
27 Justin R. La Mort, Public Housing and Public Health: The Separate and Unequal Protection of Private and Public Housing Tenants’ Health in New York City, 27 J. AFFORDABLE
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 385, 395 (2018); Rothstein, supra note 24, at 1-2, 15-16.
28 Peter Dreier, Philanthropy and the Housing Crisis: The Dilemmas of Private Charity
and Public Policy, 8 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 235, 238-39 (1997); see also Sean Campion,
NYCHA’s Untapped Assets, CITIZENS BUDGET COMM’N (Oct. 2, 2018), https://perma.cc/9775AYTA.
29 For more information on the perils of various privatization schemes, see IN THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, https://www.inthepublicinterest.org/ (last visited May 7, 2020). In the Public Interest (ITPI) is a comprehensive research and policy center focused on privatization and responsible contracting.
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logical, and predictable step toward privatization after a decades-long defunding agenda, fueled by racist rhetoric and neoliberal economics, that
began in the 1970s.
I.

THE HISTORY OF NYCHA

A. Origins of NYCHA: The Movement for Public Housing in 19th
Century New York and London
To understand how privatization became a viable option for public
housing in New York, it is important to understand the rise and fall of
NYCHA through the 20th century: the original promise of stable urban
dwellings for the working class; the subsequent experiments and improvements; and ultimately the neglect, decline, and stagnation that laid
the groundwork for RAD’s implementation in the early 2010s.30 The history of NYCHA closely tracks the shifts in political ideology that took
place over the course of the 20th century in America, from the creation of
large public works projects during and after the Great Depression to the
economic doctrine of deregulation and neoliberalism in the 1970s and
1980s.31 Support for public housing has always been closely tied to the
interests of wealthy elites who lobby the government:32 in the early 20th
century, it was a popular idea eagerly embraced by many;33 by the 1970s,
it was considered a failure and defunded;34 and today, elites are once again
embracing it—provided they are able to extract a profit.35
The groundwork for the ideology and implementation of public
housing stems from the squalid conditions in which many New Yorkers
lived in the mid-to-late 19th century and the joint efforts of philanthropists
and the government to reform that housing. Over the course of many decades, wealthy city dwellers took a dual approach, lobbying the state legislature to enact a comprehensive tenement building code that would raise
tenement standards and engaging in the construction of charitable housing
for the poor, a forerunner of government-funded public housing in the
1930s.36
While the movement to reform slum housing can be traced back to
the early 19th century, it first gained momentum during New York City’s
30

See infra Sections I.B.1 and 2.
151 Years of America’s Housing History, NATION (May 24, 2018), https://perma.cc/
7EBT-3TB8.
32 See RICHARD PLUNZ, A HISTORY OF HOUSING IN NEW YORK CITY 10, 34-36 (rev. ed.
2016).
33 See BLOOM, supra note 26, at 40-41.
34 See VALE, supra note 23, at 20.
35 See infra Section III.C.
36 PLUNZ, supra note 32, at 21-22, 88.
31
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expansion after the Civil War. In 1865, the Citizens’ Association of New
York, a group of upper-class New Yorkers concerned about the health and
welfare of the burgeoning immigrant population in New York, pushed the
state to investigate conditions in tenement housing.37 “Tenements” under
the law were broadly defined to include nearly any structure with at least
three families “living independently of one another.”38 This encompassed
a diverse array of structures that had cropped up in New York over the
course of the 19th century, including tenements, cellars, rookeries, and
squatter shacks.39 At the time, there were hardly any laws regulating
building construction in New York, and tenement buildings had few if
any windows, no running water, and little chance of escape in case of a
fire.40 Disease and overcrowding were rampant.41 Ultimately, the shockingly substandard conditions that were uncovered led to the passage of
the Tenement House Act in 1867.42
The changes to tenement structures encouraged by the law were
fairly limited in scope, mainly requiring fire escapes on the exterior of
tenement buildings and some minimum standards for water closets and
air shafts.43 Although the city delegated enforcement responsibilities to
the newly created Metropolitan Board of Health and the Department of
Survey and Inspection of Buildings, the new code’s implementation was
spotty in a rapidly growing city noted for its corruption and inefficient
bureaucracy.44 The regulations themselves failed to fully address the poor
quality of life for the largely immigrant population inhabiting tenements.
For example, even after the passage of the Tenement House Act, air shafts
remained too narrow to provide meaningful air or light, and in some cases
created just enough of a vent to actually increase the risk of fire.45 These
apartment blocks were often referred to as “dumb-bell” tenements, because the air shaft between buildings was so narrow that, from above, the
space resembled a dumb-bell.46
Passage of the early tenement regulations, while mostly ineffective
at raising the standards of existing tenements, did help raise awareness of
the intractable substandard conditions of tenements in both philanthropic
37

Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 22.
39 See id. at 5-6.
40 Id. at 15 (quoting Homes of Poor People, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 8, 1882, at 10).
41 See generally JACOB RIIS, HOW THE OTHER HALF LIVES (1890).
42 See PLUNZ, supra note 32, at 22.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 22-23.
45 THE TENEMENT HOUSE PROBLEM: INCLUDING THE REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE
TENEMENT HOUSE COMMISSION OF 1900, at 371 (Robert W. DeForest & Lawrence Veiller eds.,
1903).
46 Id.; see PLUNZ, supra note 32, at 45-56.
38
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and government circles. In 1890, the publication of Jacob Riis’s How the
Other Half Lives was another shocking catalyst that finally prompted
meaningful government intervention.47 Riis’s report contained brutally
candid photos of squalid tenement and slum conditions that horrified the
city elites.48 Outrage over the conditions depicted was widespread enough
amongst the city’s power brokers that the state legislature was finally
prompted to act, starting with a series of investigations and reports.49 A
New York State Assembly report in 1894 on tenement housing found that
while New York City was only the sixth most populous city in the world,
it was by far the most densely populated, particularly in the slum neighborhoods on the Lower East Side.50 The report also found that over half
of the city’s population was living in tenement housing.51 After over a
decade of state reports and investigations, the philanthropic community
successfully advocated for the passage of a comprehensive tenement
building code via the Tenement House Act of 1901.52 The Act finally created enforceable standards that form the foundation of the modern building code today, including set-backs on lots, sizeable air shafts, and indoor
toilets.53
In the last decades of the 1800s and the beginning of the 1900s,
philanthropists also toyed with building low-income housing themselves.
Some of these projects were designed as “model tenements” and were
meant to encourage other developers to construct more sanitary and safe
tenements.54 Model tenements designed by the building designer City and
Suburban, for example, described how their apartments were complete
“homes” with ample air and light in each room, full bathrooms, and running water in each apartment, and most of the other amenities we identify
with a functional apartment in New York today.55 Many of these projects
were small in scale, in part because government subsidies being offered
at the time were small, and the cost of land in New York had increased

47 Jacob Riis: Revealing “How the Other Half Lives,” LIBRARY OF CONG., https://
perma.cc/Y9C7-GKCP (last visited May 9, 2020).
48 Id.; RIIS, supra note 41, at 45, 51, 69, 87.
49 Riis, supra note 47.
50 Report of the Tenement House Committee of 1894, N.Y. State Assemb., 18th Legis.
Sess., No. 37, at 10-11 (1895), https://perma.cc/MYK6-ZPQ3.
51 Id. at 12.
52 PLUNZ, supra note 32, at 36-37, 47.
53 Id. at 47.
54 Andrew S. Dolkart, City and Suburban Homes Company, in AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN
NEW YORK 50 (Nicholas Dagen Bloom & Matthew Gordon Lasner eds., 2016).
55 Id.; LANDMARKS PRESERVATION COMMISSION, LP-1694, DESIGNATION LIST 224, at 14
(1990), https://perma.cc/JK7E-HU6K.
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exponentially in the last decades of the 1800s.56 As long as the government was not purchasing the land or using their existing land for projects,
the cost was prohibitive enough to prevent large-scale development.57
Early developers of philanthropic housing saw themselves as providing the working class with the stepping-stone of clean, affordable housing
on their way to the true goal of owning a single-family home in suburbia.58 As a result, many of these early housing projects tried to recruit
“model” families that could eventually ascend into a higher socioeconomic class. To screen for this type of tenant, developers created exacting
codes of rules and regulation founded in upper-class notions of morality,
an early forerunner of the strict rules that would eventually govern
NYCHA.59
Notions of who constituted the “deserving poor” were central to the
construction of early model tenements60 and were influenced by efforts to
reform housing for the poor already underway in England.61 The concept
of a certain class deserving public benefits, such as housing and
healthcare, is derived from the work of Octavia Hill, a leading proponent
of public housing in early 19th-century London.62 Moralistic notions of
how the rich need to control the behavior of the poor reach well back into
England’s past: Hill’s efforts have their roots in the passage of the Statutes
of Labourers in 1350, which made it the law for every able-bodied Englishman under 60 to work.63 During a severe labor shortage resulting from
the breakdown of the feudal structure and the devastation of the Black

56 PLUNZ, supra note 32, at 93; Eillie Anzilotti, The Long, Complicated History of Affordable Housing in New York, CITY LAB (Feb. 26, 2016), https://perma.cc/7YEN-VWK6.
57 Matthew Gordon Lasner, Paul Laurence Dunbar Apartments, in AFFORDABLE
HOUSING IN NEW YORK, supra note 54, at 52-53.
58 PLUNZ, supra note 32, at 93. Ultimately, though, public housing as a means of achieving homeownership was only available to white families, as the growth of suburbia in the mid20th century was largely shaped by redlining practices and effectively trapped families of color
in what was supposed to be a stepping-stone to their own suburban home ownership. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW passim (2017).
59 BLOOM, supra note 26, at 78-79.
60 See generally VALE, supra note 23, at 1-38.
61 BLOOM, supra note 26, at 78; see also Robert H. Bremner, “An Iron Scepter Twined
with Roses”: The Octavia Hill System of Housing Management, 39 SOC. SERV. REV. 222, 22729 (1965).
62 Bremner, supra note 61, at 224-25.
63 William P. Quigley, Backwards into the Future: How Welfare Changes in the Millenium Resemble English Poor Law of the Middle Ages, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 101, 102
(1998).
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Plague, England passed the Poor Laws, which obligated destitute individuals to work.64 These laws profoundly impacted the American conception
of poverty.65
Octavia Hill, whose charity efforts were funded by wealthy English
aristocrats, sent employees to each apartment weekly to collect rent and
determine if repairs were needed.66 Employees also monitored tenants to
ensure that they maintained lives consistent with Hill’s moral conceptions. Hill believed that “an inexorable demand for rent and an inflexible
insistence on obedience to rules” were necessary “for strengthening the
character of tenants.”67 This view was adopted by City and Suburban, a
developer constructing model tenements in pre-Depression New York
City, which mainly accepted working, married couples with children as
tenants, a demographic professed to be the spitting image of the “deserving poor.”68 Like Hill, City and Suburban routinely sent employees to observe and record tenants’ behavior, evicting those who did not live up to
their standards.69 This system of exchanging access to low-income housing for adherence to strict behavioral regulations was later adopted by
NYCHA.70 Until 1968, applicants for NYCHA apartments were screened
for any pattern of “alcoholism, irregular work history, single motherhood
and lack of furniture.”71
It is important to understand public housing’s roots in the concerns
of the philanthropic class, beginning with Octavia Hill in England, because public housing, along with other welfare programs, is a manifestation of the ruling class’s imposition of a set of moral values that aim to
guide the behavior of the poor.72 Despite the fact that public housing was
a vision created and enacted by the wealthy, our conception of poverty,
which is rooted in the Elizabethan Poor Laws, ensures that we focus on
the failings of the individual recipients of assistance and whether they
have fulfilled the obligations set out by their wealthy benefactors.73 As
Lawrence Vale notes in Purging the Poorest, “city, state, and national
officials have long treated housing assistance as a moral good, linking it
to an overarching emphasis on the importance of hard work as evidence

64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id.
Id. at 103-07.
See Bremner, supra note 61, at 223, 225.
Id. at 225.
Dolkart, supra note 54, at 48, 51.
Id. at 52.
BLOOM, supra note 26, at 94-95.
Ferré-Sadurní, supra note 23.
VALE, supra note 23, at 3-6.
Id. at 2-4; Quigley, supra note 63, at 102.
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of strong personal character and responsibility.”74 When public housing
began to fail, society could reason that the poor were to blame for not
living in accordance with moral standards imposed by the rich. Not coincidentally, public housing began to be perceived by the public as a failure
when the white working-class families that originally constituted the majority of the tenants began to move to the suburbs and Black and Brown
families took their place.75
B. The Creation of NYCHA and Early Developments
Public housing historians typically break up public housing’s history
into three distinct segments. First, from the mid-1930s to the late-1960s,
public housing was predicated on “model housing as a municipal service.”76 During this period, public housing mostly served upwardly mobile white working-class families.77 In New York, where the first public
housing in the country was constructed, this period was characterized by
an optimism about the utility of public goods across the city.78 The next
period, from the late-1960s to the 1990s, was characterized by pressure
from civil rights advocates to desegregate, which forced public housing
to accept much more racially diverse tenants.79 In New York, these decades were marked by white flight, which devastated the city tax base, and
by the fiscal crisis of the mid-1970s, which gave rise to a new socioeconomic ideology of austerity.80 Nationally, this period also saw the first
serious backlash against public housing, culminating in the demolition of
the Pruitt-Igoe Houses in St. Louis in 197281 and the moratorium on public housing construction put in place by Richard Nixon.82 Finally, the period from the 1990s to present day is characterized by budget cuts at all

74

VALE, supra note 23, at 2.
Mittie Olion Chandler, Public Housing Desegregation: What Are the Options?, 3
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 509, 512-14 (2010); see Katharine G. Bristol, The Pruitt-Igoe Myth,
44 J. ARCHITECTURAL EDUC. 163, 165-66 (1991).
76 BLOOM, supra note 26, at 5.
77 Id. at 7-8.
78 JOSHUA FREEMAN, WORKING-CLASS NEW YORK 55 (2000); see First Houses Public
Housing Project - New York NY, LIVING NEW DEAL, https://perma.cc/XU3R-X39H (last visited May 1, 2020).
79 VALE, supra note 23, at 16-17, 90-91.
80 Id.; KIM PHILLIPS-FEIN, FEAR CITY: NEW YORK’S FISCAL CRISIS AND THE RISE OF
AUSTERITY POLITICS 5-6, 21-27 (2017).
81 Colin Marshall, Pruitt-Igoe: The Troubled High-Rise That Came to Define Urban
America – A History of Cities in 50 Buildings, Day 21, GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2015, 7:52 AM),
https://perma.cc/9XJC-3UAC.
82 Agis Salpukas, Moratorium on Housing Subsidy Spells Hardship for Thousands, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 16, 1973),
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levels of government so severe that the physical infrastructure of many
developments has either failed or begun to fail, laying the groundwork for
possible privatization.83 The next several sections examine these three
time periods as they relate to NYCHA. NYCHA is a unique lens through
which to examine public housing in the United States because many other
PHAs that were initially underfunded were unable to survive a mixture of
mismanagement and savage budget cuts beginning in the 1970s.84
NYCHA, on the other hand, had a relatively stable management structure
and continued receiving sufficient city and state funding to enable its survival, although that has not been the case in recent years.85
Although the public housing crisis has roots in the budget cuts of
austerity politics, the popular conception of public housing is that it is a
failure of the poor who live in the developments, and specifically a failure
of the people of color who began to inhabit public housing in the 1960s.86
As mentioned previously, public housing began with strict moral codes
and was explicitly intended for the white working class, which affected
public housing policy for decades after.87 Budget cuts began shortly after
civil rights advocates forced public housing to accept non-white residents.88 Public housing was adequately funded during the era when it was
majority white and was ignored and mismanaged when it became racially
diverse. Once public housing filled with Black and Brown families, who
were trapped in cities due to redlining practices,89 and the budget cuts
began, the public became much more comfortable turning against public
housing and open to market-based solutions.90

83 BLOOM, supra note 26, at 5; Douglas Rice, Chart Book: Cuts in Federal Assistance
Have Exacerbated Families’ Struggles to Afford Housing, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Apr. 12, 2016), https://perma.cc/XR7M-3NVF; Roller & Casella, supra note 1.
84 See Bristol, supra note 75, at 164-66.
85 Murphy, supra note 24.
86 See, e.g., OSCAR NEWMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., CREATING DEFENSIBLE SPACE 11 (1996), https://perma.cc/4MSG-N6CN, for an analysis of how the architectural
design of the Pruitt-Igoe Houses in St. Louis fostered a dangerous environment, but also a
thinly veiled racist attack on the residents of public housing. For example: “Walking through
Pruitt-Igoe in its heyday of pervasive crime and vandalism, one could only ask: What kind of
people live here?” Id.
87 BLOOM, supra note 26, at 7-8; Robert Pear, Bias Is Admitted by New York City in Public
Housing, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 1992) https://perma.cc/EY3L-K2BS.
88 See VALE, supra note 23, at 16-17; BACH, supra note 10, at 2-4, 8 (discussing budget
cuts enacted in the wake of integration).
89 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 58, for a telling overview of how redlining practices influenced current segregation in housing, both public and private.
90 See BLOOM, supra note 26, at 168-80, for a discussion of integration in NYCHA
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and Bristol, supra note 75, for a discussion of the racist
rhetoric around mostly black public housing in St. Louis and the eagerness with which the
federal government tore down the buildings.
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1. Political Will for Construction in the 1930s
Housing reformers in New York City finally had their opportunity to
persuade the federal government to seriously invest in public housing in
the early 1930s. The moment was ripe for a number of reasons: the onset
of the Depression meant that construction in the city had ground to a halt,
so the powerful construction trades were clamoring for work and the federal government was eager to create jobs; thousands of old-law tenements
that did not comply with 20th-century building codes persisted and continued to be extreme hazards for the poor of the city; and urban planners
saw an opportunity to get rid of blighted tenements as a means of bringing
New York City in line with the then-fashionable public housing complexes being constructed throughout Europe.91 In Vienna, for example,
the newly-established socialist government had spent much of the 1920s
building public housing for a broad swath of its residents, and today 62%
of the city residents still live in some form of social housing.92 Mayor
Fiorello La Guardia, elected as a reform candidate in November 1933 in
part based on his support for public housing construction, often cited Vienna and other European cities that were aggressively building public
housing as models New York City should follow.93 New York Senator
Robert Wagner spoke of public housing as a public good like “free
schools, free roads, and free parks.”94
The bill that created housing authorities throughout the state, including NYCHA, was passed in January 1934.95 The first few developments
in Harlem and Williamsburg were constructed with Public Works Administration (PWA) funding,96 quickly followed by the Housing Act of 1937
and the subsequent Housing Act of 1949,97 which permitted larger-scale,
permanent federal funding that enabled NYCHA’s rapid expansion as
well as public housing across the country.98 Mayor La Guardia, his successor Mayor William O’Dwyer, and the ever-present urban planner Robert Moses kept up a furious construction pace, building the majority of
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BLOOM, supra note 26, at 13-16.
Meagan Day, We Can Have Beautiful Public Housing, JACOBIN (Nov. 13, 2018),
https://perma.cc/7WRY-S3UN.
93 BLOOM, supra note 26, at 22, 25-26.
94 Id. at 35.
95 Id. at 26-27.
96 Id. at 31-32; La Guardia Hails Housing Advance, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 1936), https://
timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1936/04/15/85304924.pdf.
97 Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413; Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No.
75-412, 50 Stat. 888.
98 See MAGGIE MCCARTY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41654, INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC
HOUSING 3, 10 (2014), https://perma.cc/Q3QV-VN65.
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NYCHA developments in the 1940s and 1950s.99 What made this era
unique was city and state officials’ commitment to building public housing. During World War II and immediately after, New York officials aggressively allocated city and state funds for public housing construction
and worked closely with the federal government to receive a substantial
portion of the funds allocated in the wake of the Housing Act of 1949.100
Public housing fit in well to the city’s strong social support network
at the time. In the 1930s and 1940s, New York City embodied a unique
place in American history because of the scope of social programs funded
by the city.101 Historian Joshua Freeman terms New York at this time a
“social democratic polity . . . a laboratory for a social urbanism committed to an expansive welfare state, racial equality, and popular access to
culture and education,” in opposition to the hegemonic vision of “suburban-style, single-family home living, racially exclusive neighborhoods,
and low taxes.”102 Public housing was carefully carved out to occupy a
specific place in American urban life and was designed so as to not hinder
the growth of the suburbs and the true American ideal of the single-family
home.103
2. The Fiscal Crisis of the Mid-1970s, the End of Public Housing
Construction, and the Ideology of Austerity
In the mid-1970s, New York City experienced a near-bankruptcy
that would irrevocably alter approaches to municipal spending and lead
to a steady increase in the government’s reliance on the private sector to
provide public goods. While NYCHA survived the immediate aftermath
of the crisis with its budget largely intact, the fiscal crisis in New York
and larger national recessions of the 1970s signaled an ideological shift
away from the New Deal politics that had permitted the rise of NYCHA
in the first half of the 20th century.104 In its place, a new class of economists and politicians began touting and implementing a new neoliberal
agenda: one in which the government approached providing services with
skepticism rather than considering things like jobs, healthcare, housing,
and food to be rights.105 Much like the philanthropists who shaped public
99

See BLOOM, supra note 26, at 110-14.
Id. at 117.
101 See FREEMAN, supra note 78, at 55; Esther B. Fein, For Families Struggling to Get By,
City Projects Offer a Home For Hope, N. Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 1986), https://perma.cc/CXM8LT4M.
102 FREEMAN, supra note 78, at 55.
103 MCCARTY, supra note 98, at 2, 5.
104 Chris Maisano, The Fall of Working-Class New York, JACOBIN (July 11, 2017), https://
perma.cc/S9FT-SCBH.
105 Id.
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housing in the late-19th and early-20th centuries, public discourse once
again began to treat poverty as a moral failing that could be overcome if
certain restrictions and contingencies were placed on people’s ability to
receive services.106
The fiscal crisis, which began in earnest in 1975, was caused by a
complicated mix of factors: on the local level, white flight and the loss of
manufacturing jobs in the city meant a swift devastation of the municipal
tax base, and the city was forced to carry a larger share of Medicaid costs
after the federal government slashed its contribution.107 On the federal
level, the country was still in the depths of a recession that had started
with the oil crisis in 1973, hurting local economies nationwide.108 As a
result, banks began to refuse to extend credit to New York City, which in
turn began defaulting on its loans, quickly resulting in the city being
pushed nearly to the edge of bankruptcy. To stave off financial ruin, the
state passed the Financial Emergency Act, which created the Emergency
Financial Control Board (EFCB, later renamed the FCB), an entity composed of the governor, mayor, and several business leaders.109 For years
after, the FCB had enormous power—with hardly any oversight—to determine the budgets for most city and state funding.110
The fiscal crisis gave rise to what came to be known as “austerity
politics,” where an unelected board imposes mandatory cuts on municipal
spending ostensibly as a means to balance the budget because the local
government has failed to do so on their own.111 Much of the EFCB’s focus
in the immediate years following the crisis had to do with municipal services: the City University of New York instituted a tuition for the first
time in its history, firefighter services were seriously curtailed, and there
106

An article in the Washington Post described the decline of the Pruitt-Igoe Houses in St.
Louis in thinly veiled racist terms, saying there was an “incompatibility between the high-rise
structure and the large poor families who came to inhabit it, only a generation removed from
the farm.” Bristol, supra note 75, at 167 (quoting Andrew B. Wilson, Demolition Marks Ultimate Failure of Pruitt-Igoe Project, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1973, at 3).
107 Maisano, supra note 104.
108 Kim Phillips-Fein, The Legacy of the 1970s Fiscal Crisis, NATION (Apr. 16, 2013),
https://perma.cc/GVY4-U3W5; Energy Crisis, NAT’L MUSEUM AM. HIST., https://perma.cc/
SX6X-SBCQ (last visited May 2, 2020).
109 N.Y.C. INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE, DAWN OF A NEW ERA: NEW YORK CITY FISCAL POLICY
AFTER(?) THE FINANCIAL EMERGENCY ACT 1-2 (2007), https://perma.cc/R8FE-LYTF; Sara
Margaret Hinkley, Governing the Broke City: Fiscal Crisis and the Remaking of Urban Governance 151-52 (Summer 2015) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, U.C. Berkeley), https://
perma.cc/WZ5A-GAFE.
110 N.Y.C. INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 109, at 1-2; Hinkley, supra note 109, at 15152.
111 See Maisano, supra note 104. Austerity in this context refers to municipal budget cuts,
mainly to social services, that are enacted in response to a fiscal crisis. See also Max RivlinNadler, The Affordability Con, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 7, 2016), https://perma.cc/ATK4-GSKB.
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was a protracted fight with the municipal labor union DC-37 over the
wages and benefits of city workers.112 NYCHA budgets were not immediately affected, although the economic ideology that began to take shape
in the 1970s would ultimately have a dire impact on the fiscal health of
PHAs nationwide.113
The draconian budget cuts to municipal services in New York City
took place within a broader national shift towards neoconservative economics in the 1970s. The shift began in the Milton Friedman economic
school of thought in the 1960s as a fiscally conservative response to the
New Deal and the War on Poverty, culminating in eight years of federal
budget cuts under President Reagan.114 During this time, deregulation and
trickle-down economics went “from bunk theory to federal mandate.”115
As Kim Phillips-Fein notes:
The crisis brought about a transformation of the very language
and conception of politics, as the rhetoric of fiscal necessity and
business acumen replaced a vision of politics as a domain of
struggle and negotiation . . . . The old faith in the political importance of the working class, the New Deal sense of the necessity
of government action, gave way in the fiscal crisis to a liberalism
that borrowed its framework and its values from the private sector.116
Indeed, the rise of austerity politics worked in tandem with a rhetorical shift in American public discourse: no longer was this the country of
President Roosevelt and massive public works projects. Instead, President
Nixon placed a moratorium on new public housing construction in
1973,117 and Congress created the Section 8 voucher program in 1974 to
encourage low-income tenants to begin renting in the private market.118
One of the ways to understand how the austerity measures of the
1970s laid the foundation for modern fiscal policy is through the theoretical framework laid out by Naomi Klein in The Shock Doctrine. Klein
argues that Milton Friedman’s neoliberal school of thought (a regime of
112

Phillips-Fein, supra note 108; see Joshua Freeman, Organizing New York, JACOBIN
(May 7, 2015), https://perma.cc/8P2M-GS9J (discussing DC 37’s protracted fight with New
York City).
113 See infra Section I.B.3.
114 JEFFERSON COWIE, STAYIN’ ALIVE: THE 1970S AND THE LAST DAYS OF THE WORKING
CLASS 226 (2010); Andre Shashaty, U.S. Cuts Back and Shifts Course on Housing Aid, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 18, 1981), https://perma.cc/R9HV-JV2K.
115 Rivlin-Nadler, supra note 111.
116 Phillips-Fein, supra note 108.
117 Salpukas, supra note 82.
118 Section 8 Program Background Information, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
https://perma.cc/Y354-VSYC (last visited May 3, 2020).
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deregulation and privatization) was only able to assert itself on a large
scale through “disaster capitalism,” or “crisis to capital”—that is, “orchestrated raids on the public sphere in the wake of catastrophic events,
combined with the treatment of disasters as exciting market opportunities.”119 Friedman coined a version of Klein’s phrase himself in the early
1970s, when he described his plan for aggressive privatization and deregulation in Pinochet’s Chile as a “shock treatment.”120 Klein identifies a
shock doctrine at work in disasters as diffuse as Friedman’s so-called
shock treatment of Chile, New Orleans’s complete transformation into a
city of charter schools after Hurricane Katrina, and the flood of private
contractors that have done most of the fighting in the Iraq War.121
During the fiscal crisis, some New York City officials proposed
budget cuts similar in severity to those envisioned by Friedman. “Planned
shrinkage” was a concept proposed by Roger Starr. Originally an advocate for affordable housing,122 Starr became the city’s housing commissioner during the fiscal crisis and grew disenchanted with government
spending, eventually spouting an almost comically-drawn austerity
agenda that hinged on the racist exclusion of the outer boroughs and lowincome neighborhoods from city services.123 Starr’s plan was simple: the
“withdrawal of capital and services from such neighborhoods in hopes the
devastation would drive the poor from the city.”124 He put it rather
bluntly:
Stop Puerto Ricans and the rural blacks from living in the
city . . . . Our urban system is based on the theory of taking the
peasant and turning him into an industrial worker. Now there are
no industrial jobs. Why not keep him a peasant. Better a thriving
city of five million than a Calcutta of seven million.125
While Starr may not have been advocating this sinister plot as a
means of eventually privatizing those services, his desire to cut services
to poor communities of color at this time was not uncommon and ultimately created the disastrous conditions of neglect that laid the foundation
for privatization.126 Starr’s racist budget-slashing could also be found on

119

KLEIN, supra note 21, at 6.
Id. at 8.
121 See id. at 5-9.
122 KIM MOODY, FROM WELFARE STATE TO REAL ESTATE: REGIME CHANGE IN NEW YORK
CITY, 1974 TO THE PRESENT 76 (2007).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 This is evidenced in part by Reagan’s HUD Administration eagerly slashing its own
budget. Shashaty, supra note 114.
120

300

CUNY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:283

the national level. In reference to public housing, President Nixon in 1973
declared in a radio address that “we must stop programs that have been
turning the Federal Government into a nationwide slumlord.”127 Nixon’s
cuts to public housing funding were the first in a series of budget cuts over
the next few decades, which in turn led to the rapid deterioration of public
housing.128 While The Shock Doctrine explores instances of disaster capitalism that happened rapidly, the failure of public housing took decades
of defunding and neglect to develop, thereby winning popular support for
privatization.129
3. Budget Cuts to Public Housing After the Rise of Austerity
Politics
While NYCHA was able to maintain its housing stock through the
budget cuts of the 1980s, the cuts became precipitously steeper in the late
1990s and early 2000s, leading to rapid physical deterioration and mismanagement and ultimately setting the stage for HUD to pressure the
agency to begin RAD conversions.130 This was the legacy of austerity
politics: starve a public good of the resources it needs to function; blame
the people who rely on that good as truly at fault when it begins to fail;
and then turn to the private market as the only viable solution to keep the
public good functioning. So powerful and pervasive was this narrative as
formulated and pushed by Milton Friedman, by Ronald Reagan, and by
New York City officials like Roger Starr that the creation of RAD in the
early 2010s came not from a conservative think tank, but from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in President
Obama’s administration.131
NYCHA has always been mostly funded by grants from HUD (as
well as federal housing agencies that existed prior to HUD), along with
smaller city and state subsidies.132 As a result, public housing has largely
been at the mercy of shifting political winds at the national level for dec-

127 President Finds End of City Crisis, with Dip in Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 1973),
https://perma.cc/95L5-NTBP.
128 See infra Section I.B.3 for a discussion on budget cuts.
129 KLEIN, supra note 21, at 5-9. See Glen, supra note 15, for a mainstream liberal housing
advocate’s take on why RAD is the right approach after decades of defunding.
130 See BACH, supra note 10, at 3-4, 6, 17-18.
131 RAD was created via an appropriations bill in late 2011. Consolidated and Further
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-55, 125 Stat. 552, 673-75.
132 In 2018, NYCHA’s revenue consisted of approximately $1 billion in rent from tenants
and $2.34 billion in subsidies, with $1.9 billion of those subsidies coming from the federal
government. N.Y.C COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE FINANCE DIVISION ON THE FISCAL 2019
PRELIMINARY BUDGET AND THE FISCAL 2018 PRELIMINARY MAYOR’S MANAGEMENT REPORT
FOR THE NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY 5 (2018), https://perma.cc/J22U-WTRJ.
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ades. As the nation moved farther away from New Deal public works programs and towards the laissez-faire ideology of the 1980s, the federal
government began to cut HUD’s budget in more drastic ways, thus impacting the subsidies available to local agencies like NYCHA.133
Serious budget cuts began with Reagan’s anti-spending stance in the
1980s. In his decision to cut social services, Reagan was heavily influenced by Milton Friedman and his disparaging attitude towards the poor.
In one speech, he quoted Friedman, saying, “When you start paying people to be poor, you wind up with an awful lot of poor people.”134 From
1980 to 1988, Reagan slashed HUD’s budget from approximately $36
billion to $15 billion.135 A top HUD official under Reagan was quoted as
saying, “We’re getting out of the housing business. Period.”136
Budget cuts from conservative politicians on the state and local level
in New York soon followed. In the 1990s, New York Governor Pataki
began slashing public housing funding by terminating the operating subsidies for 15 state-financed public housing developments.137 When Michael Bloomberg began his term as mayor of New York City in the early
2000s, he continued this policy and terminated operating subsidies for another six city-financed developments.138 Bloomberg also required
NYCHA to cover the costs of the NYPD policing their property, amounting to some $100 million by the end of his mayoral terms.139
While the city and state began slashing the budget for public housing
where they could, the cuts were most significant on the federal level. Between 2001 and 2013, NYCHA estimated their cumulative operating subsidy loss from the federal government to be approximately $1 billion.140
The gap between NYCHA’s Physical Needs Assessment, which is conducted every five years, and federal funding provided to NYCHA was
even greater. In 2006, NYCHA’s five-year capital need for repairs was
$6.9 billion; in 2011, it was approximately $16.8 billion; and in 2017, it

133 W. REG’L ADVOCACY PROJECT, HISTORY OF SLASHING HUD BUDGET, https://perma.cc/
E36F-BDQH (last visited May 11, 2020).
134 Greg Ip & Mark Whitehouse, How Milton Friedman Changed Economics, Policy and
Markets, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 17, 2006, 12:01 AM), https://perma.cc/Q5DP-E5FB.
135 Charles H. Moore & Patricia A. Hoban-Moore, Some Lessons from Reagan’s HUD:
Housing Policy and Public Service, 23 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 13, 14 (1990).
136 Brian Goldstone, The New American Homeless, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 21, 2019),
https://perma.cc/2MTC-SCU3.
137 BACH, supra note 10, at 3.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 4.
140 VICTOR BACH & TOM WATERS, CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y, STRENGTHENING NEW YORK
CITY’S PUBLIC HOUSING 9 (2014), https://perma.cc/UHH8-8NNH.
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had reached a staggering $31.8 billion.141 Throughout this time, federal
funding based on five-year capital needs assessments never even hit $5
billion.142
As budget cuts increased, buildings swiftly physically deteriorated.
NYCHA apartments have deteriorated more rapidly in the 21st century
than any time in their history due to a combination of an aging housing
stock and the cumulative effect of federal neglect.143 In 2002, fewer than
20% of public housing residents reported three or more “deficiencies” in
the condition of their apartments; by 2011, that number had jumped to
approximately 35%.144 Whole developments went without heat for entire
winters.145 Other issues frequently reported include rodent infestations,
lack of hot water, and mold accumulation.146 In 2018, NYCHA made
headlines for engaging in a decades-long cover-up of tests showing that
there are still high levels of lead in NYCHA apartments.147 According to
NYCHA, the current breakdown of spending required to repair its buildings includes almost $11 billion in repairs to exteriors of the buildings, $6
billion for building-wide services like boilers and elevators, $12.5 billion
for individual apartment renovations, and $2.5 billion in repairs to playgrounds and sidewalks—$32 billion in total.148
II. HUD’S CREATION OF THE RENTAL ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION
PROGRAM
The RAD program has developed against a backdrop of both intended and unintended crises that have left NYCHA crumbling. As discussed next, Ocean Bay, a development in Far Rockaway, was chosen as
the first RAD site because of the severe damage wrought by Hurricane
Sandy, a natural disaster similar to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans.149

141 N.Y.C. HOUS. AUTH., NYCHA 2.0 PART 1: INVEST TO PRESERVE 9 (2018), https://
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149 Press Release, N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. et al., NYCHA, NYS, & HUD Announce $560
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The revelations that NYCHA failed to remove lead paint from thousands
of apartments and then intentionally covered it up, which has led to federal lawsuits against NYCHA, may also be speeding up the process by
which RAD conversions are taking place.150 Crises, whether intentional
like Roger Starr’s concept of “planned shrinkage,” or natural like Hurricane Sandy, have become vehicles through which our public goods can
become private. RAD is by no means a complete privatization of
NYCHA, but, as outlined in this Note, it is a bold step in that direction,
and very much follows the trajectory of crisis-to-capital laid out by Naomi
Klein. By relying so heavily on private funds, public housing joins a long
list of public institutions that suffered from decades of neglect and have
been handed over to the private market with decidedly mixed results:
charter schools, hospital and other medical services, and prisons, to name
a few.151 NYCHA historian Nicolas Bloom explicitly ties RAD to privatization efforts in other sectors of society: “like charter schools, [RAD]
can be an important program for residents who want dramatic changes
and are willing to cast their lot with the private sector.”152
RAD came into being via a federal appropriations bill in late 2011.153
Congress, long skeptical of providing any kind of increased assistance to
PHAs, was willing to give the program a try because it was revenue neutral and would not require any increase in federal funding, as the private
entities involved could take on debt to finance repairs that the PHAs could

150 Luis Ferré-Sadurní & Frank G. Runyeon, NYCHA Has a New Plan to Clean Up Rats,
Mold and Lead Paint: Bring in Private Landlords, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 15, 2018),
https://perma.cc/VQ2R-UP8U. See also Complaint, United States v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., No.
18-cv-05213 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), https://perma.cc/RG44-QTGF (filing by U.S. against NYCHA
for their failure to protect children from lead paint in the complexes); HUD & N.Y.C. HOUS.
AUTH., AGREEMENT (Jan. 31, 2019), https://perma.cc/HGJ4-AVGN (Consent Decree after
lead paint lawsuit brought by the U.S. against NYCHA).
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PROJECT (Oct. 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/D2SF-3VVF; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS’ MONITORING OF CONTRACT
PRISONS, (Aug. 2016), https://perma.cc/XDG3-5NX7 (private prisons). Even prior HUD experiments in public-private partnerships have had mixed results: Rachel M. Cohen, Donald
Trump and the GOP are Expanding a Controversial Obama-Era Public Housing Program,
THE INTERCEPT (Apr. 2, 2018, 3:40 PM), https://perma.cc/ZQA7-AUL4.
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not on their own.154 While Congress initially conceived of RAD as a
small-scale program (hence the inclusion of “demonstration” in its name),
PHAs across the nation and HUD quickly began to see it as a faster way
to fill public housing budget gaps.155 By 2014, Secretary Castro began
pushing for much wider implementation of the program, expanding the
number of RAD-eligible units from 60,000 to 185,000 in just two years.156
Cash-strapped PHAs across the nation have quickly turned to RAD
as a possible solution for their massive budget gaps. By fall of 2016, just
a few years into this small pilot program, 400 PHAs across the country
had submitted 1,000 applications.157 As of 2019, the cap on the number
of units in the program had been extended to 455,000.158 Advocates have
expressed concern that “the RAD program has nearly quadrupled in size
over the last five years without any evaluation of its impact on tenants.”159
HUD itself quantifies RAD success in terms of how many units enter the
program, not the impact on tenants themselves160 and, according to a letter
sent to HUD by housing advocates, has made it difficult for tenant organizations to review relevant documents and contract proposals before the
deals are made between the local PHA and HUD.161
In general terms, a PHA that enters a RAD contract with HUD promises to convert public housing units from Section 9 of the Housing Act of
1937 to Section 8 vouchers by decreasing federal subsidies to local housing authorities and bringing in private property managers that will collect
rent, manage day-to-day affairs of the building, and use private capital to
cover repairs and maintenance.162 Since creation of the Section 8 program
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City Limits, Under the RADar: Community Development and the Future of NYCHA,
YOUTUBE (Apr. 24, 2019) at 2:00-2:20, https://perma.cc/GCV7-ZZ47, https://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=l6miwaLkPt0&t=191s.
155 Id. at 2:55-3:05; Roller & Cassella, supra note 1.
156 Jake Blumgart, The Obama Administration Is Expanding a Program to Fix Up Public
Housing—Too Bad the Program Might Also Privatize It, NATION (June 9, 2015), https://
perma.cc/8FZY-9FQR.
157 ECONOMETRICA, INC., OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, HUD, INTERIM REPORT:
EVALUATION OF HUD’S RENTAL ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION (RAD), at iii (2016),
https://perma.cc/5A6E-6J9D.
158 City Limits, supra note 154, at 3:05-3:15.
159 Letter from Shamus Roller, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Hous. Law Project, to Dr. Benjamin S.
Carson, Sr., Sec’y, HUD, at 1 (Oct. 11, 2017), https://perma.cc/547Z-6WGH.
160 Id. at 2; see also ECONOMETRICA, INC., supra note 157, at xvii (refraining from mention
of tenant satisfaction with the project before conversion is finalized).
161 Letter from Roller, supra note 159, at 2-3.
162 NAT’L HOUS. LAW PROJECT, supra note 14; CoreData.NYC, Directory of NYC Housing Programs: Public Housing (PH), NYU FURMAN CENTER, https://perma.cc/W5VA-J963
(last visited May 5, 2020); Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD), HUD, https://perma.cc/
8998-BJFJ (last visited May 5, 2020).
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in the 1970s, HUD funding has generally favored Section 8 over the Section 9 programs under which NYCHA was originally created.163 By cutting funding for traditional Section 9 public housing, RAD continues a
nationwide trend towards Section 8 vouchers:
HUD will no longer provide RAD buildings with direct funding
for public housing, and the units will no longer be reserved as
public housing. As HUD continues to cut funding for public housing, it will force more housing authorities to apply for RAD funding to keep their buildings in shape, resulting in more public-private funding.164
RAD also encourages public housing residents to enter the private
market—after one or two years of participation in RAD, depending on the
kind of voucher the tenant receives, they are eligible to apply for a tenantbased voucher, rather than the project-based Section 8 voucher they initially receive when RAD is put in place.165
RAD is a public-private partnership because the PHA still retains
ownership of the land, and the private landlord enters into a long-term
lease with the housing authority in order to collect rent and manage the
day-to-day affairs of the building.166 How this looks in practice will vary
depending on the PHA: in Baltimore, for example, the private property
managers actually purchased a majority share in the buildings and received low-income housing tax credits (LIHTC) for doing so;167 for
NYCHA, as described below, NYCHA itself still owns the buildings
while the new landlord leases the properties.168 In contrast to Hope VI,
which forced tenants into the private market, tenants are guaranteed the
same rights and obligations that were already in place.169 Beyond these
basic terms, implementation of RAD differs depending on the needs of
the housing authority and the contract between HUD, the housing authority, and the private landlord.170

163

MCCARTY, supra note 98, at 5-6.
Khafagy, supra note 4.
165 Roller & Cassella, supra note 1. Tenant-based vouchers are also known as housingchoice vouchers. See HUD, RENTAL ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION (RAD): FACT SHEET #1:
RAD OVERVIEW 2 (July 2017), https://perma.cc/FW87-P9RC.
166 HUD, supra note 165; Roller & Cassella, supra note 1.
167 Yvonne Wenger et al., Baltimore Housing Authority to Sell 22 Complexes to Private
Developers, BALT. SUN (Mar. 5, 2014, 9:27 PM), https://perma.cc/43QW-WW9M.
168 See infra Section III.A.
169 HUD, supra note 165; See Roller & Cassella, supra note 1, for a brief description of
the differences between Hope IV and RAD.
170 HUD, RENTAL ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION (RAD): FACT SHEET #2: STEPS IN A RAD
CONVERSION 1 (2017), https://perma.cc/V7EJ-EFH7. See HUD, RENTAL ASSISTANCE DEM164
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Although PHAs are typically deeply in debt, investors have been attracted to RAD because it is a reasonably safe, low-risk opportunity with
a stable revenue stream guaranteed by the federal government.171 Before
RAD, PHAs were barred from seeking private investment on their own,
but with the RAD agreement in place, they are permitted to collaborate
with private investors to mortgage the property and seek private funding.172 HUD encourages PHAs to raise money in a variety of ways, usually through a combination of the PHA mortgaging the property and encouraging private investors to utilize LIHTC.173 LIHTC is a lucrative tax
break program for developers who are constructing or maintaining affordable housing, sometimes providing a “dollar-for-dollar reduction in their
federal tax liability.”174
A RAD regulatory agreement also promotes a low-risk investment
opportunity by putting in place a Housing Assistance Program (HAP)
contract, the mechanism by which Section 9 public housing units are converted to Section 8 housing vouchers.175 As a HUD report from 2016
noted, “[t]he long-term Section 8 contract under RAD provides those projects with a stable and predictable revenue stream that is essential to meeting the underwriting requirements of the lenders who provide that
debt.”176 Investors are attracted by the money freed up from the mortgage,
the reliable stream of Section 8 money, and the lucrative federal tax credits.177
Responses from housing advocates to RAD’s creation and implementation have been hopeful, if skeptical. Whereas prior Republican
presidents like Reagan and Bush had done nothing but slash HUD’s
budget, and Clinton had presided over the violent demolition process of
HOPE VI, Julián Castro’s HUD was actually trying to rescue public housing by locating and encouraging new sources of revenue. An investigation

ONSTRATION USE AGREEMENT: FORM HUD- 52625 (Dec. 2019), https://perma.cc/7ZTEXLA9, for boilerplate HUD agreement prepared for NYCHA housing.
171 Rico Cleffi, The Vultures Are Circling NYCHA, INDYPENDENT (Feb. 1, 2019), https://
perma.cc/9QER-9X7V.
172 Roller & Cassella, supra note 1; Khafagy, supra note 4.
173 ECONOMETRICA, INC., supra note 157, at xv.
174 Affordable Housing Resource Center: About the LIHTC, NOVOGRADAC (last visited
Feb. 16, 2020). https://perma.cc/RGW8-8M7P.
175 ECONOMETRICA, INC., supra note 157, at xxi. See also HUD, RENTAL ASSISTANCE
DEMONSTRATION (RAD): QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE FOR PUBLIC HOUSING PROJECTS
CONVERTING TO PROJECT-BASED VOUCHER (PBV) ASSISTANCE 5-6 (Oct. 2014), https://
perma.cc/WT76-GV5G.
176 See ECONOMETRICA, INC., supra note 157, at xxi, 49-51 (“[F]or every $1 invested by
the PHA, private investors put in $3.91 in federal tax credits ($1.90 for 9-percent LIHTC
equity + $2.01 for 4-percent LIHTC equity . . . .”).
177 Id.
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into NYCHA’s first RAD conversion, Ocean Bay Apartments, noted that
“public-private partnerships come in all moral flavors . . . [a]t least in its
early stages, RAD seems to be settling at the virtuous end of the spectrum.”178
III. IMPLEMENTING RAD IN NEW YORK CITY, OR NYCHA 2.0
A. NYCHA 2.0
In December 2018, NYCHA and the New York City Mayor’s Office
announced NYCHA 2.0, a sweeping plan to generate revenue for maintenance and repairs in NYCHA buildings.179 Altogether, the plan expects to
generate approximately $23.8 billion over 10 years, out of the $31.8 billion required to meet the agency’s 2017 five-year capital needs assessment.180 The plan contains three main components: the RAD program, infill projects, and the sale of air rights. First, NYCHA will implement
RAD, with the goal of converting around one-third of NYCHA apartments to Section 8 within 10 years. The partnership between NYCHA and
HUD to implement the RAD program is called “Permanent Affordability
Commitment Together” (PACT).181 PACT is expected to generate the
most significant revenue out of the three components of the plan, totaling
$12.8 billion over 10 years.182
The second component of NYCHA 2.0 is the in-fill program, called
“Build to Preserve,” which will lease NYCHA land to developers to build
apartment towers on what are termed “underutilized” portions of NYCHA
space, including parking lots and playgrounds.183 Developers would be
required to pay for at least some of the capital needs of the NYCHA development on which they construct.184 Some of the new developments
will be required to make 50% of the units set at levels of affordability
determined by the Area Median Income,185 a disputed measure of affordability that still frequently sets rents much higher than are affordable for
178 Justin Davidson, This New York City Housing Project Works. What’s Different About
Ocean Bay?, N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER (Aug. 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/9FPF-VC6J.
179 Press Release, Office of the Mayor of N.Y., Fixing NYCHA: Mayor de Blasio Announces Comprehensive Plan to Renovate NYCHA Apartments and Preserve Public Housing
(Dec. 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/GD2M-LSMJ.
180 SEAN CAMPION, CITIZENS BUDGET COMM’N, NYCHA 2.0: PROGRESS AT RISK 2-3
(2019), https://perma.cc/8P5J-UMPC.
181 Permanent Affordability Commitment Together (PACT), N.Y.C. HOUS. AUTH. (2019),
https://perma.cc/2XST-DHUQ.
182 CAMPION, supra note 180, at 2.
183 Campion, supra note 28.
184 Id.
185 Area Median Income is a measure used by the city to determine who is eligible for
affordable apartments. Affordable housing advocates argue that the measure is not reflective
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working-class communities, while others will be required to use Mandatory Inclusionary Housing guidelines: that is, roughly 70% of the units
will have rents set at the market rate, while approximately 30% of the
units will be affordable.186 In-fill projects have so far faced the fiercest
community opposition, and all of the proposed projects are currently
stalled.187
Finally, the third component of NYCHA 2.0 is for NYCHA to generate some revenue by selling air-rights to adjacent real estate developers
to allow them to construct taller buildings.188 Developers will also be required to include some number of affordable units in such buildings.189
The first project to actually go through, in Fort Greene, will allow the
developer to build 400 units, as opposed to an initial projection of 187
without the purchase of the air-rights; 25% of these will be set aside as
affordable, and the NYCHA development, Ingersoll Houses, will receive
$25 million out of an estimated $159 million required for repairs.190
Much like RAD, both the in-fill projects and sale of air-rights purport
to raise sorely needed money in the short term but do little to examine the
long-term effects on NYCHA tenants, or gentrification in the city as a
whole. In-fill projects will destroy the parking lots and playgrounds that
NYCHA tenants, who have struggled through decades of aforementioned
neglect and disrepair, have grown to rely on to foster their communities.191 The above-mentioned air rights sale in Fort Greene in Ingersoll
Houses might provide some injection of capital to meet repair needs, but
it will also bring hundreds of new luxury units to a neighborhood already

of income for working class communities because it considers the suburban counties surrounding New York City (including Westchester and parts of Long Island), which tend to be wealthier than New York City itself. For a full discussion, see Kay Dervishi, Why AMI are the Three
Most Controversial Letters in New York Housing Policy, CITY & ST. N.Y. (Aug. 13, 2018),
https://perma.cc/3F29-M32R.
186 Campion, supra note 28. See ERIC KOBER, DE BLASIO’S MANDATORY INCLUSIONARY
HOUSING PROGRAM: WHAT IS WRONG, AND HOW IT CAN BE MADE RIGHT 4 (Jan. 2020),
https://perma.cc/PS7Z-8TVC.
187 Jeff Coltin, Infill Opponents “Instilling Fear,” Says NYCHA Exec, CITY & ST. N.Y.
(Sept. 24, 2019),
https://perma.cc/Q6R5-ESN8.
188 Zoe Rosenberg, NYCHA Air Rights Eyed by Private Developers, CURBED N.Y. (May
2, 2019, 2:10 PM), https://perma.cc/VL9G-GD6K.
189 Valeria Ricciulli, Brooklyn NYCHA Complex to Sell Air Rights in First-of-Its-Kind
Deal, CURBED N.Y. (Oct. 11, 2019, 11:22 AM), https://perma.cc/MYJ5-V8RG.
190 Id.
191 Tom Angotti, Stop NYCHA Infill Plan, Save Public Housing, CITY LIMITS (May 9,
2013), https://perma.cc/TR3Y-7WMX; Nicholas Dagen Bloom, Hidden in Plain Sight: Billions in Potential Revenue for NYCHA, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Dec. 2, 2019), https://perma.cc/
C2TM-5AC7; Harry DiPrinzio, NYCHA Development Dreams at a Crossroads, CITY LIMITS
(Dec. 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/CY4X-6Y7E.
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inundated with expensive apartments and struggling against the effects of
gentrification.192 Moreover, the one-time payment to Ingersoll Houses for
repairs is only a fraction of what the development needs now, and there is
no obligation for the developer to meet the rest of these capital repair
needs, or needs that may surface in the future.193
B. Ocean Bay, the First RAD Pilot Project for NYCHA
The first NYCHA development to undergo a RAD conversion was
the Ocean Bay Apartments in Far Rockaway. With almost 1,400 apartments and 4,000 residents,194 Ocean Bay has experienced decades-long
neglect typical of many NYCHA developments, including deteriorating
apartments, spotty heat, and crumbling exteriors.195 What made Ocean
Bay stand out as a good target for the first NYCHA RAD conversion was
the development’s ability to access FEMA money after Hurricane
Sandy.196 Situated in Far Rockaway, Ocean Bay was particularly hard-hit
after Sandy: tenants suffered from lack of heat, intermittent electricity,
and leaking gas lines for weeks after the storm.197 Along with city and
state support, the stable revenue of FEMA money helped encourage private investment for the pilot program.198 Klein’s theory of disaster capitalism is highly relevant here—much like New Orleans public schools
after Hurricane Katrina, long-neglected NYCHA housing most impacted
by Hurricane Sandy became the best place to convince the public of the
merits of privatization.199
Financing for the Ocean Bay development comes from a complicated
mix of public and private funds, and a number of entities are involved. At
the front is the property manager Wavecrest Management, which is now
the landlord for the 4,000 Ocean Bay residents.200 As landlord, they are
in charge of collecting rent, handling tenant grievances, taking tenants to
court for nonpayment or lease violations, and overseeing day-to-day repairs. Backing Wavecrest are the investors. Investments have come in
192 Jake Bittle, Unprecedented NYCHA Air-Rights Deal Nears Completion at Ingersoll
Houses, BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE (Oct. 10, 2019), https://perma.cc/CK6Q-PX74.
193 Id.
194 Press Release, N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. et al., supra note 149.
195 Khafagy, supra note 4.
196 Id.
197 Davidson, supra note 178.
198 Id.
199 Naomi Klein, How Power Profits from Disaster, GUARDIAN (July 6, 2017, 1:00 PM),
https://perma.cc/TR9X-K565. See also Dani McClain, Former Residents of New Orleans’s
Demolished Housing Projects Tell Their Stories, NATION (Aug. 28, 2015), https://perma.cc/
85Q9-8PZR, for stories of the demolition and privatization of housing in New Orleans after
Hurricane Katrina.
200 Press Release, N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. et al., supra note 149.
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from some of the most prominent banks in the country: both Goldman
Sachs and Citibank have invested millions in the project.201 In total, approximately $560 million in public and private money has been raised to
complete renovations like updating kitchens and replacing the development’s boiler system.202 Renovations will be carried out by the contractor
MDG Design + Construction.203 The non-profit Catholic Charities of
Brooklyn and Queens is also receiving funding to provide on-site social
services.204
In the few short years that Wavecrest Management has managed
Ocean Bay, interviews with residents indicate that at least some badly
needed repairs are being completed, and some residents are glad that work
is finally being done.205 One investigation reports that “improvements
such as new kitchens, renovated apartments, and increased security have
all given residents an overdue feeling of relief from the decades of decay
and despair.”206 Mold that had been accumulating in apartments since
Hurricane Sandy has been mitigated, and a new boiler system installed.207
Wavecrest has been completing desperately needed repairs, but some
residents worry that the changes are merely “cosmetic” and do not address
ongoing structural problems with buildings.208 Although Wavecrest is
charged with maintaining the properties that they operate by law, the regulatory agreement with HUD that installs Wavecrest as the property manager does not require it to inject so much capital into the buildings ever
again, meaning that Wavecrest is most likely front-loading repairs and
will not perform such large infrastructure work again.209 There are also
signs that Wavecrest is acting more aggressively to remove tenants. Since
2017, Ocean Bay residents have experienced the highest number of evictions of any NYCHA development—more than double that of the next
highest development.210 Many of these cases, at least thus far, are the result of bureaucratic miscommunications and mismanagement between
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204 Khafagy, supra note 4.
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Wavecrest and HUD and the residents.211 As discussed below, this lack
of oversight and mismanagement has been an issue in RAD conversions
across the country. Additionally, housing lawyers who have represented
tenants who live in buildings owned by Wavecrest Management in other
parts of the city describe Wavecrest as a “slumlord” that fails to do necessary repairs.212
C. Advocates’ Concerns and Uncertainties with RAD’s Implementation
Over the last two years, as it became clear that NYCHA would heavily invest in RAD, advocates have identified a number of issues in the
way the program is being implemented that could have adverse impacts
on tenants.213 One major concern amongst advocates has to do with how
many of the rights of public housing tenants will remain, and how many
will change as they become Section 8 tenants.214 NYCHA tenants will
begin to have different obligations and be governed by a different set of
regulations as Section 8 tenants. Adding to the confusion, NYCHA tenants will continue to have certain reporting obligations to NYCHA, which
administers the Section 8 program, and other obligations to their new
landlords.215 Tenants will continue to fill out their annual recertification,
which tracks their household composition and income, and send this information to NYCHA.216 They will pay rent to their new landlord, and
will have to contact the landlord about any repair issues.217 The new landlords will also be responsible for taking tenants to housing court for normal landlord-tenant issues like nonpayment of rent or violations of the
lease.218 However, NYCHA can also move to terminate the Section 8
voucher under Section 8 regulations, which can lead to a separate administrative hearing with NYCHA.219
The mechanism by which PHAs are converted to RAD is a multistep procedure that also remains a point of concern.220 One of the main
issues with RAD conversions that has faced opposition in other PHAs is
211
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Anjali Kamat, NYCHA Hires Private ‘Slumlord’ to Run Public Housing, WNYC (Feb.
6, 2019), https://perma.cc/WU22-XTUQ.
213 Louis Flores, Opinion, RAD Is a Raw Deal for Public Housing: Well-Intentioned Program Actually Hikes Rents, Empowers Landlords and Fuels Evictions, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(Feb. 15, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://perma.cc/Q5DG-QX9W.
214 Whitford, supra note 13.
215 See generally CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y ET AL., RESIDENT HANDBOOK: A GUIDE TO NYCHA
RAD CONVERSIONS 2, 14 (Mar. 2018), https://perma.cc/Y9EC-J2KX.
216 Id. at 14.
217 Id.
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219 Id.
220 Id. at 8.
212

312

CUNY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:283

tenants’ rights to return after renovations to their apartments have been
completed.221 Under RAD, HUD regulations guarantee residents the right
to return if they are temporarily relocated while renovations of their apartments occur.222 However, there have already been documented instances
of PHAs, in conjunction with the newly present private landlords, violating this procedure and refusing to allow families to return to their apartments. In Spokane, Washington, for example, residents were re-screened
for household income because the private landlord was receiving LIHTC,
which has its own income requirements, and households that were found
to be over-income were not allowed to return to their apartments.223 HUD
promises that no RAD tenants will be re-screened in such a manner.224
NYCHA also claims that tenants will not be re-screened,225 although private investors in New York involved in RAD are actively seeking the
same federal tax credits, LIHTC, that were applied for in Spokane.226
In Hopewell, Virginia, residents of a RAD-converted public housing
development settled a lawsuit in 2017 with HUD over violations of the
Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and HUD regulations during and after the conversion process.227 The development was
completely demolished and rebuilt under RAD, and the complaints and a
subsequent HUD investigation found that the new private manager and
the PHA denied existing residents the right to return, coerced them into
leaving with buyout offers, refused to provide reasonable accommodation
to residents with disabilities, and harassed families with young children.228
Illegal evictions are also a concern. In 2018, Disability Rights Maryland filed a complaint with HUD over illegal evictions at RAD-

221 Tanner Howard, Fearing Privatization: Public Housing Activists Push Back Against
RAD Plans, SHELTERFORCE (Mar. 21, 2019), https://perma.cc/EZ9R-V9DT.
222 OFFICE OF PUB. & INDIAN HOUS., HUD, PIH 2016-17, RENTAL ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION (RAD) NOTICE REGARDING FAIR HOUSING AND CIVIL RIGHTS REQUIREMENTS AND
RELOCATION REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO RAD FIRST COMPONENT – PUBLIC HOUSING
CONVERSIONS, at 41-42 (2016), https://perma.cc/TU6P-J7EL.
223 RAD Project Failed to Follow Relocation Requirements, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS.
COAL. (May 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/3ZG3-FKBR.
224 OFFICE OF PUB. & INDIAN HOUS., HUD, supra note 223, at 43; RAD Program Details
for Residents, HUD, https://perma.cc/HQ63-B3TB (last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
225 CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y, supra note 216, at 17.
226 See Cleffi, supra note 171.
227 See Press Release, Legal Aid Justice Ctr., HUD Settles Civil Rights Claims Made by
Residents of First Public Housing Site in Virginia to Be Privatized via Federal RAD Program
(Oct. 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/2QGG-RUR9.
228 Id.; see also Press Release, Legal Aid Justice Ctr., HUD to Investigate Redevelopment
Abuses (Mar. 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/H5FJ-R5P5 (explaining the allegations made against
HUD for the aforementioned settlement).
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converted housing in Baltimore.229 The complaint cited such issues as defective notices, failure to notify residents of their right to request a hearing, confusing letters, and premature filings of breach-of-lease complaints.230 The group found at least seven cases in 2017 in which residents
were improperly evicted.231
Although NYCHA tenants are not supposed to be re-examined for
their household income, they are re-assessed to determine whether they
are living in an apartment that is the right size for their household composition, under a process known as “rightsizing.”232 Tenants “have the
right to return to the same property, but not necessarily the same unit.”233
Rightsizing carries its own concern, since new landlords will be inspecting apartments and bringing eviction actions against people who are not
in the household composition.234 Although NYCHA officially has approximately 400,000 residents, unofficial estimates put the number closer
to 600,000.235 Since residents who are not included in the household composition can be evicted from NYCHA apartments, the additional inspections that occur due to RAD will make up to 200,000 people vulnerable
to eviction proceedings.236
Community input during RAD conversions and rights of resident organizations (ROs are like Tenant Associations for NYCHA) are also
points of contention. Although in the lead-up to the Ocean Bay conversion, community meetings were held to educate residents on what the
RAD program is, advocates say that “it is unclear whether or how resident
and community preferences can be exercised in the conversion process.”237 NYCHA says that resident organizations, which have been a
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powerful force for community engagement in NYCHA developments for
decades, will continue to be funded by the new private landlord.238 Curiously, a new RAD handbook notes that the property manager will be permitted to take 40% of the funds for “administration,” although the specifics of this term are not defined.239
Advocates are also concerned about the types of vouchers that tenants are receiving as part of the transition from Section 9 to Section 8
housing. As stated earlier, tenants in RAD apartments are being given
Section 8 vouchers, like low-income tenants who receive a subsidy to rent
in the private market. Although all tenants are receiving Section 8 vouchers, the apartments themselves are being converted under different programs: the majority of the apartments are being converted under RAD,
but a percentage are being converted under a section of the Housing Act
called Section 18.240 While Section 18 is mainly used to demolish public
housing, it can also be used to “dispose” of units, like in the case of RAD
conversions.241 The key difference is that the type of voucher HUD issues
is based on whether the apartment is converted under RAD or Section 18.
As of now, it is unclear how or even which apartments are being designated for Section 18 or RAD.
Private landlords are interested in this distinction because the Section
18 vouchers are more lucrative, and one investigation notes:
RAD and Section 18 function differently. RAD converts
NYCHA’s existing federal HUD funding—for both capital repairs (such as roofs and boilers) and everyday maintenance—
into Project Based Vouchers that can be used for privately run
projects. Section 18, meanwhile, unlocks more lucrative Tenant
Protection Vouchers: Where RAD vouchers only pay the difference between residents’ rent (set at 30 percent of their adjusted
gross income) and $1,220 a month, TPVs can cover the gap all
the way up to $2,014 a month.242
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The more Section 18 apartments a private landlord includes in their
contract with HUD to convert to RAD, the more they will receive in subsidies.243 Under the current NYCHA 2.0 plan, a significant majority of
NYCHA units are actually projected to be converted through the TPV
voucher system.244
There are serious issues around the ongoing affordability of apartments that are being converted under Section 18. As advocates pointed
out in a letter to NYCHA in early 2019:
RAD provides assurances of ongoing affordability that are not
matched under Section 18. Under federal law and HUD regulations, RAD requires that, at the end of the 20-year rent assistance
contract, HUD must offer to renew the contract and the owner
must accept the offer, thereby guaranteeing ongoing affordability.
In contrast, Section 18 TPVs are a budget line item subject to annual Congressional appropriations. There is no assurance that
Congress will appropriate the funds needed for the large number
of Section 18 conversions that NYCHA envisions, or that Section
18 rent assistance contracts will be sustained after they end in 20
years.245
Not only is funding for Section 18 more tenuous, but the specific
kind of voucher attached to Section 18 apartments provides tenants with
fewer rights. Since Section 18 is normally used to dispose of or demolish
public housing, it does not have the built-in tenant protections public
housing residents have, such as succession rights, a grievance procedure,
and the right to organize resident associations.246 HUD has promulgated
regulations that will require developments that apply for RAD to limit the
number of units converted under Section 18 to 25% of the total number
in the development.247 If the development chooses to convert units under
Section 18, HUD requires that the development extend the same tenant
protections to all residents, regardless of whether they are living in a RAD
unit or a Section 18 unit.248 What is alarming, however, is that some of
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the recent applications from NYCHA for RAD conversions have requested well over 25% of the units to be converted under Section 18: advocates note that NYCHA is requesting approval for a development in
Bushwick to contain 58% Section 18 units and only 42% RAD units.249
If HUD begins approving plans that contain more than 25% Section 18
units, it is unclear if Section 18 residents will still be guaranteed the same
rights as residents in RAD apartments.250
Finally, the RAD Use Agreements entered into by the new private
property manager and HUD—which regulates the setting of rents as well
as income requirements for residents—permit acceptance of higher-income residents (those making 80% of AMI) upon termination of the contract for breach or noncompliance.251 The agreement also allows HUD to
authorize reductions in the total number of rent-restricted units where the
owner is “unable . . . to otherwise provide for the financial viability of the
project.” 252
Much like the other components of NYCHA 2.0, the in-fill projects
and the air-rights sales, RAD promises a quick influx of cash for tenants
who have suffered nothing but divestment and poor maintenance for decades. In the short-term, as promised, new investors are providing enough
funding to do cosmetic repairs, which are indeed necessary.253 But in the
long-term, there are a number of uncertainties, particularly for the maintenance of the “public” half of this public-private partnership. There is little
oversight from HUD for a program that requires serious enforcement to
ensure tenants maintain the same rights they had under traditional public
housing. 254 There is no readily apparent incentive for the new private
landlords to invest more seriously down the line in infrastructure upgrades. Inevitably, much like other public spheres that have succumbed
to privatization in the United States, the momentum only goes in one direction. As Naomi Klein says:
[D]isaster capitalists (referring to the private companies that take
over the public sphere in the wake of a man-made or natural disaster) have no interest in repairing what was. In Iraq, Sri Lanka
and New Orleans, the process deceptively called “reconstruction”
began with finishing the job of the original disaster by erasing
what was left of the public sphere and rooted communities, then
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quickly moving to replace them with a kind of corporate New Jerusalem.255
There will be more pressures to further privatize: from HUD, as the
agency continues to struggle with an ever-shrinking budget; from the
PHAs themselves, desperate for new sources of revenue; and from the
private sector itself, which will inevitably require an increasingly greater
return on its investments.
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF NYCHA AND ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR
PUBLIC HOUSING
Much of the rhetoric around RAD, even from advocates, takes on a
resigned air of inevitability, as though privatization, at least partially, is
the only way to raise funds for public housing. As NYCHA historian Nicolas Bloom says, “Given the dominance of the private sector in federal
policy, and the current balance of power in Washington, those who believe in purely public housing—the old NYCHA—will have difficulty
developing an alternative and equally beneficial plan. The ball is in their
court as the NYCHA 2.0 plan develops.”256 While many longtime
NYCHA advocates have come to the same conclusion, the air of inevitability given to a market-based solution like RAD will only result in further
privatization efforts, not only in public housing, but in all public goods
that we have fought to create and maintain over the course of the 20th
century.
One of the debates about the implementation of a program like RAD,
a public-private partnership, is whether it truly amounts to privatization.
NYCHA has gone to great lengths to stress that RAD is not privatization.257 The public housing residents who have formed Fight for NYCHA,
however, see things differently.258 They argue, “[B]ecause the New York
City Council has a non-stop record of turning over strategic assets to the
private sector—from charity hospitals, to public library branches, to
parks, and gardens—that [sic] there is a demonstrated failure of leadership to audit Mayor de Blasio’s financial projections for RAD.”259
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NYCHA activists intuit what theorists like Naomi Klein spelled out, that
capitalism is never content with small gains when there is the possibility
of ever-greater profits, particularly when there is an ailing public entity
that the government will not assist.260 NYCHA developments sit on some
of the most valuable land in the city.261 Knowing what we do about the
gargantuan profits of some of the early investors in RAD, like Goldman
Sachs and Citigroup, and the dependency of these banks on year-overyear increases, it is likely that they will seek bigger returns from their
investment into RAD down the line. As outlined above, RAD has many
built-in protections to ensure that affordable housing is not lost—for now.
But some of those protections are tenuous, like the Section 18 units that
are contingent on congressional appropriation funding, or PHAs’ spotty
records of fulfilling the “right to return” promise in other cities.262
Given the private sector’s generally poor, sometimes appalling, track
record when tasked with managing public goods, 263 it is crucial for advocates to think creatively and ambitiously about ways to push federal funding back toward public housing. Part of this will require an acknowledgment of the United States’ cultural shift toward a nation of renters rather
than owners, a shift that is already taking place: as more people in the
country populate urban areas, more of them are renting, and protecting
affordable rents becomes more important.264 This is to say that we should
seriously rethink the approximately $134 billion in tax subsidies we provide to homeowners every year, mostly in the form of mortgage interest
deductions, which disproportionately benefit wealthy homeowners.265
Mitchell-Lama, an affordable ownership housing program with its own
set of issues, did a great deal in the mid-20th century to marshal public
and private money to build permanently affordable housing.266 While the
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difficulties of construction and finding land in New York have grown exponentially worse since those developments were built, it is a program
worth revisiting if HUD and the city are so keen on using private funds to
preserve affordable housing.
Although politically challenging in our current government, there are
proposals to make public housing funding a renewed priority. The Green
New Deal for Public Housing, a bill spearheaded by Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Bernie Sanders, aims to spend $180
billion over 10 years to revitalize and upgrade public housing across the
country with green infrastructure.267
It is important to remember as well that cities across the globe have
dedicated resources to keep public housing completely out of the private
sector. Berlin, which had its own privatization movement for public housing after the end of the Cold War, is beginning to re-nationalize developments after years of skyrocketing rents.268 In Singapore, where most residents live in some form of public housing, it is considered “an asset to
the public purse, as well as a social asset—and carries no stigma.”269
Ultimately, decent and accessible public housing is achievable in the
United States—we had it for many years. Instead of turning to a private
housing market that relies on maximized investment returns, that has and
continues to extract immense profits from buildings all around public
housing developments even as they languish and crumble, we should
acknowledge the destructive and inhumane practices of capitalism while
simultaneously protecting and strengthening a viable alternative to commodified housing. Only a solution that guarantees permanent affordability and protections through public control can truly create justice for those
who have suffered through intense racial segregation, exclusion, and dispossession at the hands of federal, state, and city governments, and the
real estate industry. Public housing is a human right, and NYCHA residents are long overdue for it.

public and private sources and contained long-term commitments to affordability. They are
not without their own problems in today’s red-hot New York real estate market, though. Norman Oder, In Rising Market, Vital Mitchell-Lama Program at Crossroads, CITY & ST. N.Y.
(Mar. 23, 2015), https://perma.cc/RL3M-GDVE.
267 Diana Budds, What Would a Green New Deal for NYCHA Look Like?, CURBED N.Y.
(Nov. 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/5B2M-HFC7.
268 Berlin Spends €1 Billion to Buy Back Public Flats, LOCAL, (Sept. 27, 2019),
https://perma.cc/C3CY-4UYY.
269 John Bryson, A Century of Public Housing: Lessons From Singapore, Where Housing
is a Social, Not Financial, Asset, CONVERSATION (July 31, 2019, 9:52 AM), https://perma.cc/
4FPV-XU77.

